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The Soviet Political System in the 
Transition Period 
Iwao Takayama 
More than fifty years have passed since the Soviet Government 
started its ambitious historic experiment m 1917. There exist 
only a few major modern political systems that have had a 
comparable record of havmg met the test of history without 
serious breakdowns for five consecutive decades or more. The 
・significant feature of the Soviet experiment, however, is not 
only that it has lasted long but also that it was started and 
ever since has been guided exclusively by a highly monolithic 
political party which has sought to extend its tentacle mto 
all spheres of social life in the hope of turning its ideological 
aspirat10ns into reality. 
Whether or not there has taken place a significant change in 
the factors which so far have accounted for the relative stability 
of the Party’s rule is, therefore, a question not only interesting 
from an academic point of view but also one which will have 
enormous political implications for the Party leadership. Signs 
of such change are now beginnmg to appear in various phases 
of Soviet society. One notable phenomenon is the emergence 
of social strata which, on the basis of specialized skill and 
knowledge, form their corporate interests. The so called 
“technological elite”， and intellectuals of various sorts, both 
inside and outside the Party, may be cited as examples. The 
cleavages and conflicts between these strata and the Party 
leadership are already observable, and if the leadership fails 
to deal with them properly, they could create a serious 
disturbance for the system as a whole. 
Up to now the leadership has been handling the conflicts 
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within the system pnmanly through “suppressrnn＇’ and not 
through ”regulation”. What deserves attention is the fact that 
stabihzatrnn of social and economic life and emergence of 
various social strata which could challenge the authority of the 
Party, are makmg the suppressrnn of conflict an increasingly 
costly undertakmg. Thus, the Party seems to be now at an 
important point in its history at which it must shift gradually 
from the principle of“conflict suppression" to that of “conflict 
regulation" if it wishes to adapt itself successfully to the new 
circumstances In the face of this challenge, what are. the 
policies and attitudes characterizmg the Party leadership? 
Are they along the lines to regμlate the conflicts resuitmg 
from internal cleavage, or are they still directed at their 
suppression ? 
In order to inquire mto the attitude of the Party leadership 
m this respect, this essay will examine the changes that have 
recently appeared m the Party statutes. The Party statutes 
are a most direct and real manifestatrnn of what the leadership 
stands for, and any sigm日cantchange m their attitude will 
eventually find its expression in them. Analysis of the statutes, 
however, requires a rat10nal hypothesis and frame of reference 
which will give order and direction to a mass of phenomena 
which would otherwise remam unintelligible. The model used 
in this essay may be termed a“dual relation approach”. It 
focuses its attention, firstly, on the relation among the 
political actors at the leadership level, and, secondly, on the 
relation between the leadership and the rank and file members 
as reflected in the latter’s accessibility and resistabihty to the 
former. Thus, it attempts to explore the meaning of the 
changes in the Party statutes in terms of a possible change 
in this dual relationship. By “accessibiity”is meant the 
amount of influence which the rank and file白Rexert over 
ther leadership. By ”resistabiii ty”is meant the degree to 
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which th長rankand file members are free from political 
control which the leadership impcises through orders, threats, 
inhibitions, etc. As for the relation among the political actors 
at the leadership level, there 1s, on the one hand, what may be 
termed a mono-centric leadership type in which power 1s vested 
exclusively in the hands of a single md1v1dual or a small group 
of individuals tied together by homogeneous attributes. On 
the other hand, there is what may be called a poly-centric 
leadership type according to which a system of checks and 
balances develops among the political actors who compete and 
interact for the attainment of power accordmg to the insti-
tutionalized rule of politics. It should be clear by now that 
the mono-centric leadership type 18 based on the principle of 
“conflict suppression”， for it does not allow the existence of 
rival groups, whereas the poly-centric leadership is based on 
the prmc1ple of "conflict regulation”. Similarly, a low degree 
of accessibility and resistability on the part of the rank and 
file points to the principle of“conflict suppress10n”， while a 
high ac氾essibiltyand resistab1lity presupposes the regulat10n 
of conflict within the system. 
The 1961 Party statutes registered some mteresting changes. 
On the one hand, the mono centric type of leadership was 
resolutely maintained: On the other hand, however, there was 
observable a distinct tendency toward greater accessibility and 
resistability on the part of the rank and file. The basic question. 
士hatmust be asked, then, 1S whether the coexistence of these two 
trends will create certain strain and tens10n in the functioning 
of the system itself. Theoretically,. the answer must be“yes"; 
for the mono-centric leadership type, on the one hand, and 
mcreased accessibility and resitabihty, on the other, are based 
on mutually contradictory sociological premises of conflict 
control: namely, the former pomts to“suppression”， and the 
latter to“regulation”of cc>nflict. The coex1stel)ce of these two 
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principles will sooner or fatter create functiona"I imbalance for 
the・ system. Balance may be re”gained either by lowering the 
accessibihty and res1stability, or by infroducing the poly-
centric leadership type into the system. 
The removal of Khrushchev m 196i was an indication that 
the Party leadership had already become aware of the systemic 
imbalance described above. This assumpt10n seems to be fully 
warranted by the statutory changes made at the 23rd Party 
Congress m ・1966. The analysis of the 1966 Party statutes shows 
clearly that the new leadership under Brezhnev and Kosygin 
has embarked upon the policy of lowering the accessibility and 
resistabihty for the rank and file, conceivably, with the aim of 
re-gaining a balance for the system 
There is, however, no strong reason to beheve that the new 
Party leadership is determined to pursure the present”hard” 
pohcy over a long period of time in the future The process 
of de-Stalimzation, and Party democratization as a corollary of 
it, seems irreversible, and the leadership must be fully aware 
of this. It is quite likely, then, that the not too distant future 
will see a return to a relatively high degree of accessibihty 
and resistability for the rank and file. Thus, as far as the 
short-range and intermediate-range prospects for the Soviet 
system are concerned, it may be assumed that the leadership, 
while adhermg to the mono-centric type at the leadership 
level, will oscillate between the policy of intensified control 
and that of relaxat10n vis邑－visthe rank and file. 
From the foregoing observation will emerge two quest10ns. 
Firstly, is this alternating policy an adequate one to deal with 
the mcreasing conflicts between the l田 dershipand the various 
social strata? Secondly, in the process of this alternat10n, 
will it ever become possible for the Party leadership to move 
gradually from the mono-centric to the poly-centric type in 
the long run? Although these are the quest10ns which the 
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Soviet system is obligated to answer for itself, tbe wnter of 
this essay feels that they should be answered in the affirmative, 
provided that, in this alternatmg process, the Party leadership 
will not break down from within. The Party leadership is 
today highly powerful but its position is very precarious due 
to lack of institutonalized rules to regulate the use of this 
immense power. Thus, the leadership is constantly exposed to 
the danger of naked power struggle and a possible breakdown 
from within. Will the leadership be capable of keeping this 
danger to a mimmum while making a shift from the mono-
centric to the poly-centric type? This is the ultimate test by 
which the strength of the Soviet political system in its transition 
period is to be judged. 
